Europe says it has proof Russia fatally poisoned Alexey Navalny. Can international law hold the Kremlin to account?
Five European countries say they have proof Navalny was poisoned
On February 14, the U.K., Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Sweden announced that Alexey Navalny had been poisoned in a Russian prison with a lethal toxin — epibatidine. The governments said the conclusion was based on independent laboratory analyses of samples taken after Navalny’s death in 2024.
They also called for Russia to be held accountable for violating two international agreements: the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
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Four of the countries published identical versions of the statement. Sweden added an additional paragraph:
The death of Navalny is a tragedy for his family and for Russia. We will continue to push for urgent action to prevent Russia from using science to put us all in danger.
Why two conventions? Are poisons classified as both chemical and toxin weapons?
It’s a complicated question. The United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Sweden clearly take that view. Russia’s representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), by contrast, argued that toxins — including epibatidine — should be regulated exclusively under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
What do the conventions themselves say?
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of:
- toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes”;
- weapons or delivery systems designed to use such toxins “for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”
In other words, the existence of a secret state program to produce a toxin for use as a weapon would constitute a violation of the BTWC.
The Chemical Weapons Convention, for its part, bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and use of toxic chemicals that can cause death. But it includes several exceptions — for example, for peaceful uses such as medical or pharmaceutical purposes. Here again, everything hinges on intent — whether the chemical was specifically developed or produced for the purpose of killing.
Marc-Michael Blum, a former official at the OPCW, told Meduza that formally speaking, any toxic chemical can fall under the scope of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In his view, however, epibatidine is not suitable as a battlefield chemical agent because it is too difficult — and too expensive — to produce.
So only the CWC bans the use of poisons?
No. The use of poisons is also banned under the BTWC, even if it isn’t obvious at first glance. While the convention itself doesn’t contain a direct prohibition on use, review conferences of its member states have clarified that such use would violate the treaty.
For example, the final declaration of the Fourth Review Conference in 1996 states:
Article I
- The Conference reaffirms that the use by the States Parties, in any way and under any circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I of the Convention.
Article IV
- The Conference reaffirms that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited by the Convention.
So European countries believe Russia acquired this toxin specifically to kill people?
It appears so, yes.
It’s unclear whether the five governments have any additional evidence beyond laboratory analyses of Navalny’s biological samples — such as intelligence indicating the existence of a secret Russian program to produce epibatidine.
More details could emerge if the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, France, or Sweden move to initiate a formal investigation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
How could they do that?
By filing a complaint with the U.N. Security Council. Such a complaint must include “all possible evidence confirming its validity.” The Council could then decide whether to open its own investigation.
There are no other enforcement mechanisms under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
Wouldn’t Russia simply block such a complaint?
Almost certainly. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia could veto any resolution. But it would also get access to all the evidence collected by the European governments — something Russian officials have openly indicated they want.
On the day the joint statement was published, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said: “When there are lab results and chemical formulas, then there will be a comment.”
Russia’s permanent representative to the OPCW, Vladimir Tarabrin, likewise said Moscow was ready for “a substantive expert discussion based on facts.”
That may explain why the five countries’ statement mentions only actions related to violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Meduza requested additional comment from several of the foreign ministries that issued the statement. As of publication, only the Dutch Foreign Ministry had responded. It declined to comment on any “potential future steps.”
What steps have the countries already taken?
The five countries’ permanent representatives have written to the director general of the OPCW “to inform him of this Russian breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention.”
It doesn’t appear that this was a formal request under Article IX of the convention. That article allows for a complex procedure that could ultimately lead to an on-site inspection of a specific facility within the territory of a state suspected of violating the treaty. The inspected state is obligated to grant access. However, this mechanism has never been used.
In Marc-Michael Blum’s view, such an inspection would be unlikely to yield meaningful results. The epibatidine, he says, was probably synthesized in an ordinary chemical laboratory — and any traces could easily be removed before OPCW inspectors arrived.
Is an inspection the only way to establish a violation?
No. The OPCW Technical Secretariat can determine whether a specific substance was used. That has happened before — in the case of the poisoning of Sergey Skripal and his daughter in 2018 and of Alexey Navalny in 2020.
In both cases, the Technical Secretariat confirmed that the chemical nerve agent Novichok had been used. But it did not formally designate Russia as being in violation of the convention.
What came of those previous investigations?
In practical terms, very little.
Even if Russia were formally found in violation of the convention, concrete measures would have to be adopted by the Conference of the States Parties — the body that includes all member states. It could, for example, restrict or suspend certain rights of a violator, or, “in cases of particular gravity,” refer the matter to the U.N. General Assembly or the Security Council. Only the latter body has the authority to impose binding measures — and Russia holds a veto there.
The only thing Moscow has lost so far is its seat on the OPCW’s Executive Council. But that happened in 2023, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moscow attempted to regain the seat in 2024 and 2025 but failed to secure enough votes.
Explainer by Denis Dmitriev